Due to life, some exciting new projects and the launching of my company this past week "UNZera Consulting", I did not have time to write a blog post. Instead I am posting a short excerpt from a chapter in my book. The chapter is an analysis of the Rogatchover Gaon's theory on color. Enjoy.
What is color? Does the appearance and color of an item have anything to do with its internal identity? Or is it of an external nature, merely a layer of appearance that interacts with the viewer, and not a statement of its intrinsic character?
The Rogatchover developed an intriguing and engaging theory
for understanding how halakha views the nature of color.
The Talmud (Chullin 136b[1])
records a dispute between Shammai and Hillel regarding different colored figs.
The law is that one cannot take trumah (one of five different types of
tithes a Jew had to take from his produce in order to de-sanctify it and permit
it for consumption) from one species of produce for another type of produce. For
example, one could not tithe oranges for apples etc. Each plant, vegetable or
fruit had to have the tithe separated from its own species in order to make the
rest of that species of produce permitted for consumption.
The Talmud asks whether one can take trumah from black figs
in order to de-sanctify white figs? Is that permissible? Beit Shammai says no
and Beit Hillel says yes.
In the world of the Rogatchover this debate revolves around
defining what the nature of color is. Is it merely an incidental part of an
item, or is it integral to its existence[2].
Is it intrinsic or extrinsic?
If color is integral to an entity’s existence then the white
and black colored figs would be considered separate species and one would not
be able to tithe from one to the other. If however, color and appearance are
merely incidental extrinsic elements, then the hue of the fig would not be a
determinant factor and one would be able to tithe from one to the other.
To justify this broad statement let us look at several building
blocks of the Rogatchover’s theory.
According to Jewish law[6]
a thief
can acquire the stolen item if he has affected a permanent change in the item. For example, if a thief stole raw wool and smoothed it and dyed it, then that wool becomes his property. This is because in essence the original item is no longer existent, since it is impossible to give back the original item.[7]
can acquire the stolen item if he has affected a permanent change in the item. For example, if a thief stole raw wool and smoothed it and dyed it, then that wool becomes his property. This is because in essence the original item is no longer existent, since it is impossible to give back the original item.[7]
If
however, the change initiated by the thief can be undone then he has not
acquired the item and must return it since it is able to revert to its original
form and thus is still extant. This in turn necessitates the obligation of
returning the stolen object.
The Talmud (Baba Kama 101a) asks[8]
an intriguing question. When one steals dye and uses it to color a piece of
wool, what is the thief’s obligation regarding returning the stolen dye. The
Talmud says that it depends on how we understand the idea of color. As Rashi
explains[9], ‘is
appearance an existence or not’.
If color is a substantive existence then halakhically the
dye is considered to be extant and on the surface of the wool. If color is not
accorded a category and substantive existence then we view the dye as having
been absorbed into the wool and no longer in existence as an independent
entity.
The question then becomes[10],
is the dye not on the wool, i.e. it is gone by means of absorption, and hence
the thief must pay the owner or is the dye on the wool still seen as
independently existing on the surface of the wool and therefore the thief need
not pay since he can tell the owner ‘here is the dye before you’?
This Gemara is a core building block of the Rogatchover’s
theory of color. We have here a practical halakhic query based on the
philosophical question of the nature of color.
The Rogatchover contends[11]
that in our case the color permeates the very essence of the wool and irrevocably
alters its identity. This would mean that the thief need not make restitution
to the owner since the dye is indeed existent and he can say ‘here is the dye
before you’.
This is true even if one bleaches the wool and removes the
dye. Since the color has permeated its core, it has changed it forever, even if
the new color departs from it[12].
Thus we see that to paint is to fundamentally create a new entity. Once that
new entity is formed it makes no difference if it sheds its outer layer of
appearance that was introduced to it since the new appearance has drilled into
its meta-physical core.
This explains the Talmud’s ruling that if one dyed wool with
a liquid that is absolutely prohibited (i.e. it is forbidden to have any sort
of pleasure from at all), we must burn the wool. The question is, why can’t we
bleach the wool and extract all the color and dye that was inserted into it?
According to our analysis it is crystal clear. Because even
once we extract all the dye, this wool remains something that has as part of
its identity, the forbidden liquid. Hence, it is prohibited entirely forever
since the dye has irrevocably altered its core identity.
Since forming color and appearance is seen as an irrevocable
creative act as we saw by the thief and the wool, it is no surprise that we
find the Talmud employ this imagery for God’s act of creation.
The Talmud in Niddah 31[13] compares the forming of man to one who paints with different colors. Indeed the Talmud in Brachot (10a) using a clever etymological twist interprets the verse “there is no rock like God” as saying ‘there is no artist like God’.
The Talmud in Niddah 31[13] compares the forming of man to one who paints with different colors. Indeed the Talmud in Brachot (10a) using a clever etymological twist interprets the verse “there is no rock like God” as saying ‘there is no artist like God’.
This fascination and fixation with portraying God as an
artist is because the act of forming color and appearance is seen halakhically
as an existential and fundamentally creative act.
The Talmud in Brachot (10a)[14]
as well indulges in this portrayal with God as an artist.
[1] דתניא היו לו שני מיני תאנים שחורות ולבנות וכן
שני מיני חטין אין תורמים ומעשרים מזה על זה ר' יצחק אומר משום ר' אלעאי ב"ש אומרים אין תורמין וב"ה אומרים תורמין
“If one had two different colored figs, one black and
one white, Beit Shammai says we cannot tithe from one to the other and Beit
Hillel says we can.”
[2] The
Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim (part 1, chapter 73) discusses the nature of color. He
brings the opinions of the Mutakallemim that color is intrinsic to physical
matter. They say that if one takes snow, for example, the white color is there
in every piece of snow and is part of its very existence. The Rambam however
rejects their opinion and says that one sees that when things are ground down
into tiny flecks and turn into powder the color is gone. Therefore color is
only part of the whole and not existent in the individual parts.
[3]
See Michtevei Torah#283:
בגדר
צורח בלא חומר מחלוקת
בית שמאי ובית הלל חולין דף
קלו ע״ב אם מראה הוה
מציאות אף דזה גדר צורר בלא
חומר, דאם יטחן החומר
לדק נתבטל המראה כמ״ש בספר
המורה בהקדמות של
המדברים
[4]
See also Shut Varsha Siman 50:
ועיין בחולין דף קלו
ע״ב דב״ש וב״ה פליגי
אם שינוי מראת הוי מין אחד
או ב׳ מינים
[5]
Michtevei Torah #55:
ותליא אם מראה הוה
עצם איכות, או רק
מכמות,
In other words, this question can be formulated in a
way that lends itself to a discussion of quality versus quantity. See Chapter ?
for more on this.
[6]
Baba Kama 79a
[7]
According to rabbinic law, even a change that can be reversed transfers
ownership to the thief in order to encourage robbers to repent. See Baba Kama
95a
[8]
איבעיא להו
יש שבח סמנין על הצמר
או אין שבח
סמנין על הצמר
“They asked- is there substance to the color on the wool or is there no
substance to the color on the wool”.
[9]
כלומר חזומא מילחא היא או
לאו
מילחא
[10]אין שבח סמנין
על גבי הצמר ובעי
שלומי ליה או דלמא
יש שבח סמנין על גבי
צמר וא״ל הא מנחי
קמך שקלינהו שקלינהו
“Is the dye not on the wool [i.e. it is gone by means of absorption], and
hence the thief must pay or is the dye on the wool and therefore the thief need
not pay since he can tell the owner ‘here is the dye before you’.”
[11]
In Michtevei Torah #37:
ורק גבי צמר אמרינן
יש
שבח סמנים ע״ג. ר״ל
דגוף הצמר נעשה כמו עיקר
האיסור, ולא מהני
אם העבירו ע״י צפון, זח דיוק הגמ׳
ב״ק דף קא, דאל׳׳כ
למה לן להדליק, יעבור עליו צפון,
וע״כ דנעשה עצם, וכמו
חתיכה נעשית נבלה גבי בשר
בחלב,
[12]
In this respect, color can be linked to the halakhic concept of chatikha
nasa neveila or ‘a piece that becomes a carcass’. This is the halakha that
a piece of meat that absorbs some milk is fundamentally changed into a new
entity.
“Rav said (Chullin 108a), once the milk has imparted
taste to the piece of meat, the meat itself becomes neveila (meat which
was not properly slaughtered), and causes all of the other pieces of meat to be
prohibited.”
The Rishonim explain that Rav does not relate to the
piece of meat as a mixture of meat and milk, but rather views the meat as if it
were inherently prohibited. Therefore,
when this meat is mixed with other pieces of meat, we do not attempt to
contrast the drop of milk with the rest of the mixture, but we must rather
neutralize the impact of the entire piece of meat on the mixture. The Talmud describes this phenomenon as
"Chaticha Na'aseit Neveila,". How can we understand this
phenomenon?
The permitted
meat is transformed into a prohibited substance and is viewed as the
prohibition itself instead of just something that was impacted by the forbidden
item. In our case, the piece of meat itself is viewed as a prohibited substance
and we no longer focus on the milk that prohibited the meat in the first
place.
This is true even if one squeezes all the milk out of
the piece of meat. It is of no consequence since the meat underwent a
metamorphosis and its identity transformed into a prohibited item and is not
anymore contingent on the original forbidden agent, the milk.
[13]
על כי נוראות נפליתי נפלאים מעשיך ונפשי יודעת
מאד בא וראה שלא כמדת הקב"ה מדת בשר ודם מדת בשר ודם אדם נותן זרעונים בערוגה כל אחת
ואחת עולה במינו ואילו הקב"ה צר העובר במעי אשה וכולם עולין למין אחד דבר אחר צבע נותן
סמנין ליורה כולן עולין לצבע אחד ואילו הקב"ה צר העובר במעי אשה כל אחת ואחת עולה למינו
“R. Yose the Galilean gave the following exposition:
What is the meaning of the Scriptural text, ‘I will give thanks unto Thee, for
I am fearfully and wonderfully made; wonderful are Thy works; and that my soul
knows well’? Come and see the contrast between the potency of the Holy
One, blessed be He, and that of mortal man.
If a dyer puts different ingredients into a boiler
they all unite into one color, whereas the Holy One, blessed be He, fashions
the embryo in a woman's stomach in a manner that each element develops in its
own natural way.”
[14]
מאי דכתיב (תהילים קג) ברכי נפשי את ה' וכל קרבי את שם קדשו אמר ליה בא וראה שלא כמדת
הקדוש ברוך הוא מדת בשר ודם מדת בשר ודם צר צורה על גבי הכותל ואינו יכול להטיל בה
רוח ונשמה קרבים ובני מעים והקב"ה אינו כן צר צורה בתוך צורה ומטיל בה רוח ונשמה קרבים ובני
מעים והיינו דאמרה חנה (שמואל א ב) אין קדוש כה' כי אין בלתך ואין צור כאלהינו. מאי אין צור כאלהינו אין צייר כאלהינו
“What does it mean “ Let my soul bless the Lord and
all my innards his holy name”? He replied, come see how the ways of the Lord
are entirely different then the ways of flesh and blood [i.e. man]. Flesh and
blood paints a picture on the wall and is not able to insert into it life or a
soul, stomach and intestines. Whereas God is not so. He can paint a picture
within a picture and inserts into it life and a soul, stomach and intestines.
This is what Hannah said “there is none as holy as the Lord for there is
nothing besides you and there is no rock as our God”. What does it mean no
rock? It means there is no artist like our God.”
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